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ASCAP AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS: THE
STORY OF A REASONABLE COMPROMISE
A LTHOUGH protected from the beginning against unauthorized repro-
duction of their artistic creations,' the author and composer have tradi-
tionally found it difficult either to retain the various rights of copyright
in their creations or, if these rights were retained, to enforce them
against infringing users.2 As a result, recent times have seen creators
join together in order to obtain a fairer share of the revenue derived
from their works.3
Such groups of creators have been confronted with two basic and
* This comment was adapted from a paper entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition by Richard W. Ergo, LL.B. x958, Duke University, while he was a third-
year student in the School of Law. Mr. Ergo is now a member of the Washington bar
and is associated with Holman, Michelwait, Marion, Black & Perkins, Seattle, Wash-
ington.
' The Constitution, art. x, § 8, authorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Under the original copy-
right statute, a copyright owner's rights included only the rights to print, publish, and
vend the copyrighted composition, that is, to make and sell copies of the work. Act of
May 3, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Copyright rights were extended under the Copyright Act
of T909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), however, to include also the right to make new arrange-
ments or adaptations of the work, the right to have it recorded for electrical or me-
chanical reproduction, and the right to perform it publicly for profit.
'Klein, Protective Societies for Authors and Creators, z953 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS
ANALYZED 19, 20 (C.C.H. 1053), recites almost incredible examples of typical treat-
ment of the artistic creator by publishers during the nineteenth century which forced
him "to overcome his natural tendency to be a qoner,' and induced him to join his
fellow writers in order to survive." A discussion of the creator's traditional inability
to enforce his copyright rights and of the tremendous effect of recent radically changing
conditions in the music entertainment field is found in Finkelstein, Antitrust Laws and
the Arts, 10 CONFERENCE ON THE ARTs, PUBLISHING AND THE LAW 55 (University of
Chicago Law School, May 5, 1952); and in Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public
Interest--Regulation of Performing Right Societies, i9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 275
('954).
' The protective societies that have been organized by creators are extremely
numerous. Most of them are concerned only with protecting against violations of
creators' statutory rights; a few others have the purpose of advanicing creators' interests
in their relations with users. Some of the latter, such as ASCAP, are combinations
of creators and publishers concerned with ultimate users of artistic products; others,
such as Songwriters' Protective Association, are organized primarily to advance creators'
interests in their relations with the publishers. See Klein, supra note z.
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frequently conflicting principles of permissible business activity in a dem-
ocratic society. No democratic society, on the one hand, can question that
literary and artistic products should be given sufficient legal protection
to encourage their creation and development. On the other hand, it is
just as essential an element of a democratic society that artistic products
be used in the freest possible manner and with the fewest possible re-
straints, public or private. Thus, while the protections given or per-
mitted must be adequate, the law should not sanction obstructions to
general use and enjoyment of artistic creations at a fair cost. The inter-
action of those two principles is nowhere better illustrated in reference
to creators' protective societies than in the history and development of
the most significant of these groups-the American Society of Composers.
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).
ASCAP
ASCAP is an organization dealing exclusively in the licensing of
copyright performing rights. That is, the only copyright right which
it licenses is that of public performance for profit. Its membership, as
the name implies, comprises authors and composers of musical composi-
tions and publishers of such compositions. Although the relationship
between these two dissimilar groups of members has often been tenuous,
the memory of past individual helplessness has been a cementing force
holding the organization together and permitting it to achieve and main-
tain its present prominence.
ASCAP's beginning can be traced to a night in 1913 in a New York
restaurant, when composer Victor Herbert heard an unlicensed per-
formance of the music from one of his musical shows then playing on
Broadway." Upon calling the attention of the proprietor to the fact
that the copyright law forbade such unauthorized use of copyrighted
music, Herbert was informed that since no admission was charged to
enter the restaurant, no part of the copyright law was involved. In the
dispute which followed, individual copyright owners, such as Herbert,
became aware that individually it was physically and financially im-
possible for them to enforce their rights in all, or even most, instances
of such infringement. Moreover, their individual weakness was further
emphasized when restaurant, cabaret, and hotel owners united against
the composers. Their only hope lay in a corresponding unification,
'See Allen, The Battle of Tin'Pan Alley, Harpers Magazine, Oct., 1940, p. 514.
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and thus was born ASCAP, an association of I7o authors and composers
and twenty-two publishers5 of music.
The legal offspring of this dispute, Herbert v. Shanley Co.,' upheld
the right of a copyright owner to compensation for public performance
of his work, even-in cases involving restaurants and hotels where no ad-
mission was charged. Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Holmes wrote.'
The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They
are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the
price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those
present are expected to order is not important. It is true that the
.music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which prob-
ably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in
surroundings that to people having limited powers of conversa-
tion or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure not to be
.had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay it would
be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket.
Whether it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and
.that is enough.
Following this decision, the federal courts extended the concept of
public performance for profit to radio broadcasts of copyrighted musical
compositions,' reproduction of radio broadcasts by loudspeakers in-
stalled in hotel lobbies,9 performances in motion picture theaters, 0 and
performances in dance halls." In the wake of these decisions, ASCAP
grew to-many times its original size in number of members and, at the
same time, expanded internationally by affiliating with the International
Confederation of -Performing Right Societies, an organization which
controlled twenty-one various national groups. ASCAP gained control
of the great bulk of music- in commercial demand"2 and, at least in its
."The initial inclusion of publishers in the group was justified by the importance of
their activities and their interests in,,the artistic products of music composers and
authors., See Chafee, Reflqctions on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUA. L. REV. 503
(194s).
a 242 U.S. 591 (1917)-
'Id. at 594, 595.
'Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 41 (6th Cir. 1925).
SBuck'v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1930
"Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924).
"'.Dreamland Ballroom v. Shapero, Bernstein & Co., 35 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929).
"
2 At times it has been estimated that ASCAP has controlled anywhere from 85 to
9o% of the popular and classical music of this country that has not passed into the
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own estimation, had become the most important performing-right society
in the world.1
The organization that grew up was relatively simple in structure and
operation. Originally, any professional composer or author of music
who had had regular publication of five or more works with a sub-
stantial number of performances was eligible for membership, as was
any publisher of music whose repertory was used by ASCAP licensees.
The management of ASCAP was conducted by a twenty-four man, self-
perpetuating board of directors, composed half of composer-members
and half of publisher-members. The business of ASCAP was the
licensing of performing rights assigned to it by its members. As a
matter of policy, only blanket licenses for specific use were granted.
That is, the licensee was given blanket authorization to use the entire
repertory of ASCAP for such specific types of use as radio broadcasts or
restaurant or dance hall performances. 4 ASCAP charged an annual fee
for such licenses, and this constituted its sole source of revenue.
Distribution of the revenue to its members was (and is) somewhat
unique. Net proceeds were split in half between the publisher and
author-composer groups, an obvious and easy initial solution. Final dis-
tribution to the individual members was by no means so easy of solution,
however. Until recently, no strict formula was followed, although each
member's share was generally based upon the amount of commercial
performance (as determined by independent music surveys) of the mem-
ber's compositions, the member's seniority in ASCAP, and the quality of
the composition of each. Although the propriety of the first standard
has never been questioned, there has been a great struggle between
younger and older members of ASCAP over the presence of a seniority
standard. Moreover, the practical difficulties involved in a subjective
appraisal of the quality of any composition has given rise to the allega-
tion that privileged insiders and unproductive writers were being per-
mitted to take an unfair share of ASCAP's revenues.
Accompanying such internal problems, there were even more serious
external disputes. Early in the life of ASCAP, a new user, radio,
public domain. See Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music:
The ASCAP Comnent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 294, 297 (x954).
" White, Musical Copyrights .v. the Anti-Trust Laws, 30 NED. L. REv. 50, 52
(x951), citing THE STORY oF, ASCAP (1946).
" Licensing on the basis of individual compositions--'per piece" licensing-has
never been in great demand by licensees and, moreover, is not considered commercially
practicable. Finkelstein, Antitrust Laws and the Atrts, supra note 2, at 58.
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entered the music entertainment field. 5 At first, ASCAP licensed em-
bryo radio stations free of charge or at nominal fees in order to en-
courage and aid the financial development of potentially good cus-
tomers. Shortly thereafter, as radio became a commercial success,
ASCAP began to demand a share of the profits. The Federal courts
having declared that radio performances of musical compositions were
public performances for profit, it appeared that ASCAP could legally
assess reasonable fees against radio broadcasters.
Bitter disputes between radio and ASCAP arose during the 1930's,
however, over what constituted fair licensing.16 Generally, these dis-
putes were settled by contractual agreement, ASCAP getting a fixed fee
plus a percentage of the station's commercial income. But in March
i94o, ASCAP proposed a substantial reduction in the rates paid by in-
dividual stations, especially smaller ones, to be more than offset by a 732
per cent fee on the income of the networks, which had previously paid
nothing. The networks rejected this offer, and both sides prepared for
a conflict. The radio broadcasters insisted that submission to ASCAP's
power of taxation would mean the end of an independent broadcasting
industry and proceeded to abstain from all use of ASCAP music. In its
stead, radio subsisted for an entire year upon music in the public domain
and that controlled by Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), a younger per-
forming-right society, with a much smaller and less valuable repertory,
but with direct ownership connections in the radio industry.
On the other side, ASCAP stood unrelenting in its position, insisting
that the new terms were equitable because (i) the increase in license fees
was based upon the increase in profit to radio broadcasting, much of
which was attributable to use of ASCAP compositions (2) the primary
financial burden was placed upon the networks which were best able to
pay, and (3) ASCAP members' losses in other royalties owing to the
increased popularity of radio were far greater than any sums received
from the broadcasters.' 7  But as a result of the public's failure to exert
pressure on the radio broadcasters to play ASCAP music and the im-
minence of an antitrust action, ASCAP was forced to accede to the terms
of the networks.'"
"5 See Allen, supra note 4.
"
8See Comment, xi AIR L. REV. 395 (-94o).IT The advent of successful radio and television broadcasting is said to have cut the
sales of sheet music, the primary source of composers' royalties prior to the entry of
these media, by 90%. Finkelstein, Antitrust Laws and the Arts, supra note 2, at 57.
"s See White, supra note 13, at 55.
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THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1941
Prosecution of the antitrust action continued, however. Fearing the
possible disastrous consequences of a full hearing, ASCAP avoided any
determination on the merits of its Sherman Act status by entering a plea
of nolo contendere to the criminal charges against it. Similarly, it
avoided a hearing on the merits in the civil action against it by entering
into a consent decree with the Government.
This decree'9 placed significant limitations upon ASCAP's future
operations. In the first place, ASCAP was thenceforth enjoined from
acquiring or asserting any exclusive performing rights as agent, trustee,
or otherwise on behalf of any copyright owner. At the same time, how-
ever, it was permitted to place substantial limitations on the reserved
individual licensing rights of its members. ASCAP could require mem-
bers to pay over to it all proceeds derived from such individual issuance
of performing licenses and could also prohibit members from issuing ex-
clusive licenses to commercial users of music or from assigning their
rights to any other performing-right society. The decree further en-
joined ASCAP from entering into or recognizing any license agree-
ment which discriminated in price or terms between licensees similarly
situated, from refusing to issue per piece licenses to any user other than
broadcasters, and from restricting the performance rights of any licensee
merely to exact additional compensation.
Significant internal changes in structure and operation were also
ordered. ASCAP was required to select its board of directors by a mem-
bership vote in which all author, composer, and publisher members were
to have the right to participate, the number of votes of any member
being determined by his classification in the Society (i.e., his status as to
distribution of revenue). Distribution of revenue was ordered to be
made only on the basis of the number, nature, character, and prestige of
the compositions written or published by each member, the length of
time during which the composition has been in the ASCAP repertory,
and the commercial popularity of the compositions. Also, membership
could only be restricted to professional authors and composers of music
who had had one or more compositions regularly published.
Finally, the decree provided that, for purposes of enforcement of its
terms, representatives of the United States Department of Justice should
have reasonable opportunity to examine all of ASCAP's books and
records and to interview all of its employees and officers.
"Reported in 1940-1943 Trade Cas.' 56,xo4 (S.D.N.Y. 194x).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
THE ALDEN-ROCHELLE CASE
The close of the consent decree proceedings ended the dispute be-
tween ASCAP and the radio broadcasters. ASCAP's peace was short-
lived, however. Shortly after the entry of the consent decree of 1941,
serious difficulties arose between ASCAP and a group of motion-picture
theater owners.20
With the introduction of sound into motion pictures, the motion-
picture industry had become interested in ASCAP, which then controlled
the great bulk of copyrighted music suitable for synchronization with
motion pictures. The policy of ASCAP was to reserve the performance
rights in such motion-picture music, licensing only the synchronization
rights to the producers. The performance rights to ASCAP music were
licensed to individual theater owners, who had to obtain a license in
order to show movies which contained ASCAP music.
2 1
Objecting to this policy, over 150 theater owners instituted an action
under the Clayton Act in I942 for treble damages and for an injunction,
alleging that ASCAP had violated the federal antitrust laws. This suit
was discontinued, however, until 1947, when ASCAP announced a new
method for computing license fees for theater-exhibitors. The proposal,
which would have effected an increase in all fees, in some cases from l2oo
to 1500 percent, involved computation of the fee on the basis of the
theater admission price rather than seating capacity, as had previously
been the case. ASCAP contended that this method would merely pass
on to its members a reasonable portion of the profits accruing from in-
creased theater admission prices. The theater owners did not agree and,
even though. ASCAP withdrew its proposal, rejuvenated the 1942 action
and carried it to a final decision.
"Although not directly connected with the legal dispute between ASCAP and the
theater owners, the relations between ASCAP and motion-picture producers had been
far from harmonious. In 1974, the producers had spent $00,000 in an attempt to
organize their own counterpart performing-right society, but had failed. See Comment,
25 IND. L.J. x68, 173 (195o). Thereafter, many producers joined the ASCAP organi-
zation by purchasing music publishing firms which were members of ASCAP. By 195o,
the producers represented a substantial part of the publisher membership of ASCAP,
sharing in the 3/ of the net proceeds which went to the publishers to the extent of
37%. Timberg, supra note 12, at 297.
'The fact that motion picture producers insisted upon acquiring both the syn-
chronization and the performance rights in motion picture music composed by non-
ASCAP members indicates that this was a premeditated policy forced on ASCAP by the
producers. In either case, of course, the cost of the performing right license was borne
ultimately by the theater exhibitor.
[Vol. 199: 258
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The resulting decision, Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 22 held that
ASCAP had violated the antitrust laws in its dealings with the exhibitors,
although the court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they
had been injured.23 The court's opinion contained a sweeping denuncia-
tion of ASCAP's structure and activities.
Almost every part of the Ascap structure, almost all of
Ascap's activities in licensing motion picture theaters, involve a
violation of the anti-trust laws. 24
That Ascap is a monopoly, within the language of § 2 of the
anti-trust laws, was clearly established at the trial."a
The combination of the members of Ascap in transferring
all their non-dramatic performing rights to Ascap, is a combina-
tion in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, which is pro-
hibited by § i of the anti-trust laws. It restrains competition
22 So F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"The injunctive relief granted in the decision of the case was limited to the
specific practices complained of by the motion picture exhibitors. The decree ordered
ASCAP to divest itself of all rights of public performance in compositions which had
already been synchronized with movies, to refrain from acquiring such rights in any such
compositions, to refrain from refusing to grant such rights to motion picture producers
in future cases of synchronization, to refrain from licensing such rights to anyone other
than motion picture producers, and to refrain from conspiring with motion picture
producers to force exhibitors to obtain performing licenses as a condition to the
exhibition of licensed motion pictures.
In a subsequent clarifying opinion, Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, So F. Supp.
9oo, 9oz (S.D.N.Y. 1948), the court explained that all parts of the decree were designed
to strike down the means by which ASCAP and its members in combination with mo-
tion picture producers were able to require motion picture exhibitors to obtain ASCAP
licenses prior to and as a condition of exhibition of motion pictures containing ASCAP
music. The last 4 terms of the decree, the court maintained, were essential to accomplish
this end. However, the first, divestiture of performing rights in compositions already
synchronized with movies, the court decided, was subject to valid criticism, not because
"it goes beyond what may eventually prove to be necessary to protect plaintiffs, but
because it may be difficult to enforce and may lead to some confusion and a great
deal of litigation." Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, supra, at 9o3. Accordingly, the
decree was amended to provide that ASCAP or any of its individual members so long
as they remained members should refrain from attempting to enforce the motion picture
performing rights of any composition so long as ASCAP remained an illegal combina-
tion and monopoly.
' Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, So F. Supp. 888, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).5 Ibid.
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among the members of Ascap in marketing the performing rights
of their copyrighted works.2
The combination of the authors, composers, and publishers
in the Ascap organization, their obligations to the association,
the rights they conferred on Ascap and the reservations they
made in their arrangements with the motion picture producers,
have given Ascap the power to fix the prices at which the per-
forming rights are sold to the exhibitors.1
7
The strong language of both Alden-Rochelle opinions portended
serious curtailment, if not outright prohibition, of ASCAP's operations
in the future. For at the time the opinions were rendered, two anti-
trust actions had been filed by the Government against ASCAP, one
involving its activities with international performing-right societies, the
other to amend the consent decree of 1941 which regulated ASCAP's
domestic activities. Since Alden-Rochelle and Witmark v. Jensen28 in-
volved complaints of private parties, their effect was restricted to the
limited legal and economic interests of those parties. At the same time,
however, these cases disclosed broad legal deficiencies in ASCAP's opera-
tion and structure. Moreover, the 1941 consent decree, which covered
little more than the antitrust grievances of the radio industry, had
become a source of discontent to both users of ASCAP music and mem-
bers of ASCAP, as the increasing number of complaints to the Depart-
ment of Justice attested.2" It was thus clear that revision of the 1941
decree was necessary to remedy these deficiencies and, as well, to accom-
modate ASCAP to new developments in the music entertainment field.8"
ASCAP's INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ASCAP, again not eager to try the cases on the merits under the
Sherman Act, entered into two consent decrees. The first,3 an inde-
pendent decree in itself involving ASCAP's international relations, en-
joins the Society from interfering with the rights of its members to issue
nonexclusive licenses for performance outside the United States. And
" Id. at 894.
7 Id. at 894, 895. This conclusion was endorsed by another federal court shortly
after the Alden-Rochelle decision. See Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 8o F. Supp. 843
(D.C. Minn. 1948).
2 See note 27 supra. 29 Timberg, supra note 12, at 301.
" See note 2 supra.
" United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 62,594 (S.D.N.Y. 595o).
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in its relations with foreign performing-rights societies, ASCAP is pro-
hibited from (i) accepting from any such society any license for or
assignment of musical performing rights in excess of twelve months'
duration; (2) refusing to grant licenses for performing rights to any
such society, except where it has breached a substantial term of an exist-
ing license or would not capably represent ASCAP in the foreign coun-
try; (3) granting any performance license to any foreign society which
does not expire at least six months following the expiration of any license
granted to it by the foreign society5 (4) negotiating for the issuance of
licenses to any foreign society while also negotiating for issuance to,
ASCAP of a license from such foreign society;32 (5) attempting to pre-
vent or to discriminate against any foreign society issuing nonexclusive,
nondiscriminatory licenses to any performing-right society other than
ASCAP; and (6) conditioning the licensing of any foreign society uporr
the reciprocal licensing of ASCAP by that foreign society.
As to international performing-right societies with which ASCAP
may now deal, the decree forbids ASCAP to participate in any way with
any international organization which prevents its members from licensing
nonmember societies, imposes numerical territorial limitations upon
membership, prevents any American society from dealing without re-
striction with any foreign society, or has the purpose or effect of allo-
cating or restricting territories or otherwise eliminating competition
among performing-right societies.
To make the decree effective, ASCAP was ordered to sever all
connections with over twenty named foreign societies. Again, as in
1941, the decree provided that the Department of Justice should have
reasonable opportunity to examine ASCAP's books and records and to
interview its employees and officers for the purpose of securing compli-
ance.
Although this decree prohibited many of ASCAP's former activities,
its effect has not been unduly to hamper ASCAP's relations with for-
eign performing-right societies. ASCAP continues to have certain ex-
"' The practical effect of this provision is to force ASCAP to negotiate first for the
licensing of ASCAP's repertory to the foreign society. Only thereafter can ASCAP
negotiate for a performance license of the foreign society's compositions. This provision
serves the purpose of preventing ASCAP from coercing a license from the foreign society
by the threat of withholding its vast repertory from the foreign society. Finkelstein,
Public Performance Rights in Music and Performance Right Societies, 7 COPYRGWir
PROBLEMS ANALYZED 69, 8o (C.C.H. i951).
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change difficulties with foreign societies, but in general, its arrangements
with such societies operate smoothly within the terms of the decree.38
THE I950 AMENDMENT TO THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1941
The second consent decree34 was a comprehensive amendment to the
1941 consent decree. While all the provisions of the I941 decree were
preserved or strengthened in the amended consent decree of 1950, the
latter, at the same time, added several significant new features.
A. General Provisions of the Decree
The general provisions of the decree restrain ASCAP from (I) deal-
ing in any copyright performing rights other than on a nonexclusive
basis and interfering with issuance of nonexclusive licenses of perform-
ing rights by individual members 3" (2) discriminating in price or other
terms between licensees similarly situatedi (3) granting any perform-
ing license for a period in excess of five years' duration (except in
regard to licensing of motion picture performance rights);-" (4) en-
forcing motion picture performance rights against any motion picture
exhibitor and bringing any action for copyright infringement against
any exhibitor relating to such picture performing rights or against any
user relating to compositions not contained in ASCAP's official public
repertory; (5) restricting any member's right to withdraw from the
Society at the end of any fiscal year upon his giving three months' notice
and upon his agreeing to honor existing obligations between ASCAP and
any of its licensees;37 and, finally, (6) exercising any power to restrict
public performance for profit by any of its licensees in order to exact
additional consideration or to regulate recording fees, unless such re-
striction is reasonably necessary to protect the compositions involved
against indiscriminate performance, or to protect the value of public or
' Finkelstein, note 3z supra.
United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 6z,595 (S.D.N.Y. 195o).
" The 195o decree does not include the conditioning limitations permitted ASCAP
under the ig4i decree, which had negated the effect of the prohibition against its ac-
quiring or asserting the exclusive right to license performance.
"6 From a practical economic standpoint, the complete integration of music into
motion pictures demands that the performing license in such cases be permanent. In
light of the specific restrictions upon ASCAP's dealings with motion picture producers
and exhibitors, this exception is necessary from the standpoint of the consistency of the
decree.
"The provision limiting ASCAP's performing licenses in nonmotion-picture cases
to 5 years' duration has the effect of making complete each member's right of with-
drawal from the Society.
[Vol. 1959: :58
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dramatic performing rights therein, or to protect ASCAP's rights in
connection with any claim or litigation involving such rights.38
B. License Issuing
The decree regulates ASCAP's licensing policies with respect to three
major classes of users of music. First, ASCAP must issue performing
right licenses on request to any radio, television, or wire-service net-
work in terms which permit both simultaneous and delayed perform-
ances by any or all stations or outlets affiliated with such networks, with-
out requiring a separate license for each station or outlet for such per-
formances. 9 Second, licenses must also be issued on similar terms to
any manufacturer, producer, or distributor of transcriptions intended for
radio or television broadcasting, without requiring separate licenses for
each broadcasting station for such performance. Finally, ASCAP must
issue to any motion-picture producer a single license of motion-picture
performance rights covering the entire United States.
The decree then specifically spells out certain limitations and re-
quirements as to the "single" licenses to be issued to the motion-picture
producers. The license may relate only to pictures produced or in
production within one year of the effective date of the license and may
not charge for any performance occurring before the decree. Upon
request of the producer, such licenses must be issued on a per film basis
for compositions in ASCAP's repertory. The licenses must be negotiated
and issued on an individual basis, not on an industry-wide basis. Nor
may any member of ASCAP's board of directors participate in such
negotiation or issuance or in enforcement of any such license where
that member at the time has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest
in any producer or its affiliate or subsidiary, or has any contractual rela-
tionship with any such producer."
"Thus, while individual members' rights are protected against indiscriminant per-
formances, ASCAP is limited to its legitimate function, granting performance licenses,
and is prevented from applying pressure to gain advantages as to synchronization and
recording rights.
" Licensing at the source, provided for in the 1949 decree as to radio, was thus
carried over to television, the wire services, and motion pictures. There appear to be
no technological or economic reasons why any of these industries should not be in-
cluded.
,0 This provision obviously is intended to prevent any future conflicts of interest
in those cases where ASCAP publisher members are subsidiaries or affiliates of motion
picture producers. Section XVII of the decree expressly reserves the right of the Gov-
ernment at any time.within 2 years to move for modification or vacation of the terms
of the decree which regulate the manner of licensing motion picture performance rights.
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ASCAP is further ordered by the decree to grant any user making
written application a nonexclusive license 6f all compositions in the
ASCAP repertory. The privilege of "per piece" licensing is retained,
but is available only upon written request of the user and approval of the
interested ASCAP member.
C. Setting of License Fees
In regard to license fees for radio and television broadcasting,
ASCAP is enjoined, unless the user expressly desires otherwise, from
basing its fees for commercial programs on a percentage of the income
which the licensee obtains from programs not performing compositions
in the ASCAP repertory. In the case of sustaining programs, ASCAP
must vary the fee either according to the number of performances of
ASCAP compositions during the term of the license or according to the
number of programs on which such compositions are performed. With
respect to unlicensed radio or television broadcasters, ASCAP is ordered
to issue, upon written request, per program licenses, the fees for which,
in the case of commercial programs, are to be expressed in terms of
dollars, requiring payment of a specified amount for each program or
a percentage of the sum paid by the sponsor of the program to the
broadcaster. Fees charged for music used on sustaining programs are
likewise to be expressed in terms of dollars or based upon a percentage
of the card rate which would have been applicable for use of the broad-
casting facilities had the program been commercial.
Where stations have a greater percentage of sustaining programs than
of commercial programs, the decree authorizes considerations of the
economic situation of such stations, subject to the provisions as to dis-
crimination in fees, in order to give the stations a genuine economic choice
between per program and blanket licenses. 41 In all cases, however, the
decree prohibits ASCAP from requiring or influencing prospective li-
censees to negotiate for a blanket license prior to negotiating for a per
program license. The decree also directs ASCAP to expend its best
efforts to avoid any discrimination between the fees fixed for various
types of licenses that would deprive prospective licensees of a genuine
economic choice between the various types.
In order to supplement the provisions requiring compulsory licensing
"1 The intent here is to protect educational, "good music," and other commercially
weak stations. This provision was recently relied on by a group of television broad-
casters who mtaintained that their high developmental costs justified a lower fee than
that which had been asked by ASCAP. See Timberg, supra note 22, at 31 x.
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of all users, the decree provides an intricate mechanism for court de-
termination of reasonable license fees. Thus, ASCAP must advise each
applicant of the fee which it deems reasonable upon receipt of written
application for a performing license. If the parties are unable to agree
within sixty days, the applicant may apply to the court for determina-
tion of a reasonable fee. Upon notice of institution of such a proceeding,
ASCAP, in turn, must give notice thereof to the Attorney General. 42
The burden of proof is placed upon ASCAP to show the reasonableness
of the fee requested. During the pendency of the proceedings, the
applicant is given the right to use the compositions, and provision is made
for the fixing of an interim fee by the court at which a license is to be
issued. Upon final determination, the fee set by the court becomes
retroactive to the commencement of such interim license, and failure
of the applicant to accept such interim license or to pay the interim fee
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the application. The final deter-
mination of a reasonable fee extends to other applicant licensees simi-
larly situated, although fees determined without court intervention
do not have this effect.4
D. ASCAP's Organization
The amended decree also makes several provisions for altering the
internal affairs of ASCAP. Thus, in all-encompassing language, the
decree prohibits any officer, director, or agent of ASCAP from par-
ticipating in or voting on questions relating to transactions between
ASCAP and a licensee where there is any pecuniary or contractual rela-
tionship between the officer, director, or agent and the licensee. In
regard to distribution of revenue, the decree commands that primary
consideration be given to objective surveys of performance (other than
those sanctioned by the member directly) by or for ASCAP.44
"" This provision appears designed to make such court determinations of reasonable
fees even more distasteful than might otherwise be the case in order to encourage ASCAP
both to attempt to offer reasonable fees initially and to agree to reasonable compromises.
,' These provisions for judicial fee fixing are salutary in that they appear to preclude
the possibility of future disputes (wherein the public is the real loser) such as those
between ASCAP and the radio industry and those between ASCAP and the theater
exhibitors. Also, by withdrawing ASCAP's power to fix prices, these provisions prevent
ASCAP from taking undue advantage of users, especially small users.
"Without precluding consideration of subjective factors such as seniority or quality,
the decree thus orders that an objective standard-commekcial acceptance--be the primary
determinative. A background of the special problems here and a description of the
current arrangement for distribution of revenue to members can be found in Timberg,
supra note 12, at 316-i9.
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The decree also orders an amendment to ASCAP's articles of associ-
ation to prohibit any member from ever threatening, instituting, or con-
tinuing any action for infringement of his copyright performing rights
based upon acts occurring prior to the decree or where corresponding
synchronization rights had been granted prior to the decree. The articles
must further be amended to prohibit any member, while a member of
ASCAP, from granting synchronization rights to any motion-picture pro-
ducer unless corresponding performance rights are granted therewith
in conformity with the decree.45
Several provisions of the decree are designed to insure a democratic
administration of the affairs of ASCAP and to assure its members an
opportunity to protect their rights through fair and impartial hearings
based upon adequate information. All members are to have the right
to vote in the selection of their representatives to serve on the board of
directors, due weight being given to the classification of each member
in determining the number of votes accorded him. Further, election
of all directors must take place at least every two years, and representa-
tion on the board, in so far as possible, is to be given to members with
different participation in revenue distribution. The general basis of
classification for voting must be available in writing to every member,
and every member must be able to appeal his classification to an impartial
arbiter. In all proceedings involving such classification, moreover,
records must be kept to apprise members of the action taken.4 6 ASCAP
must also prepare and maintain for public inspection a list of all musical
compositions in its repertory, showing author, composer, and current
publisher of each composition.
As under the 1941 decree, membership in ASCAP must be open to
all composers or authors of professional standing who have had one
composition regularly published. Publishers whose musical publications
have been distributed on a commercial scale for at least one year and who
assume a normal financial risk in the business of music publication must
also be admitted to membership in ASCAP. And as in the previous
decrees, representatives of the Department of Justice must be given
reasonable opportunity to examine ASCAP's books and records and to
' Thus, the decree prevents individual members from taking advantage of past
misuse of power by ASCAP and, as well, from circumventing the spirit of the decree, in
regard to performance licensing of motion picture music, by individually splitting syn-
chronization and performance rights.
' That these provisions for protection of individual members and minorities in
ASCAP have been effective is shown in Timberg, supra note 22, at 314-16.
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interview its employees and officers for the purpose of securing com-
pliance with the terms of the decree.
Finally, the court has retained jurisdiction of the case in order to
enable either party to make application for further orders or directions,
for modification of the decree, for enforcement of its terms, and for
punishment of violations. Strong language at the end of the decree
reserves the right to the Government to apply to the court at any time
after five years from the date of entry for vacation or modification of the
decree in any respect, including the dissolution of ASCAP.4
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1950 ASCAP CONSENT DECREES
The entry of these consent decrees manifests recognition of the
inherent value of collective action in the field of copyright licensing
and enforcement, and, at the same time, recognition of the necessity
of compelling ASCAP to comply with the basic policies of the antitrust
laws. In prohibiting restrictive licensing on an international basis with
international performing-right societies, the decree has outlawed prac-
tices, dearly illegal under the Sherman Act,4 which are unnecessary to
ASCAP's continued prosperity.49 Similarly, in the domestic field, al-
though its powers are sharply restricted, ASCAP retains the effective
ability reasonably to enforce the rights of its members.
That ASCAP constituted a monopoly under section two of the
Sherman Act so long as it retained effective power to acquire exclusive
licenses and arbitrarily to set license fees seems clear, since it thus had
power to exclude competitors and to fix prices&"0 By prohibiting ASCAP
from acquiring or dealing with copyright performing rights other than
on a nonexclusive basis and interfering with (or conditioning as under
the i941 decree) issuance of nonexclusive licenses of these rights by in-
dividual members, and by requiring free entry and exit of members to
and from the Society, the court has effectively impaired ASCAP's power
to exclude competitors. Moreover, the provisions against discrimination
in prices or other terms between licensees similarly situated, and against
restricting performances by any licensee in order to exact additional
consideration, together with. the provisions for judicial fee-fixing, have
"'The primary source of the commentary in footnotes 32-46, relating to the i95o
consent decree, has been Timberg, supra note 12.
"See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
"See Finkelstein, supra note 32.
0 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United States
v. Aluminum do. of America, 148 F.zd 4z6 (2d Cir. 1945).
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destroyed ASCAP's power to fix prices arbitrarily. Even if ASCAP's
monopoly power is not as clear as was suggested in the language of the
Alden-Rochelle opinions,5 the decrees achieve a salutary effect in barring
any attempted acquisition or assertion of such power by ASCAP.
The remaining provisions of the decrees deal with problems under
section one of the Sherman Act relative to ASCAP's organization as a
copyright pool.5" It has been held by the Supreme Court5 3 that the
monopolies granted to copyright and patent owners under the law are
primarily to encourage development of the arts and sciences and, there-
fore, that reward to the owners is secondary in importance to the bene-
fit which is to be derived by the public. Accordingly, where patent
and copyright owners have undertaken to act beyond the limited grant
of the law, the Court has judged their actions in the light of usual anti-
trust principles.54 In cases of pooling arrangements by patent owners,
the Court has ruled that while this action is not illegal per se," the
arrangements are to be condemned when the pools are used to abuse
the antitrust laws, as by fixing uniform prices or terms for the sale of
patented goods.56 The same rule has been carried over into the copy-
right field.
The domestic consent decree of 1950, while not eliminating the
pooling aspect of the ASCAP arrangement, has severely limited
ASCAP's ability to act as a copyright pool. As stated, the decree at-
tempts to prevent unreasonable action aimed at excluding competitors
and at arbitrarily fixing prices. The ASCAP pooling arrangement gives
increased power to members with larger copyright holdings, so that
joint action by a few such members may determine the course of dealing
"See Shull, Collecting Collectively: ASCAP's Perennial Dilemma, 7 CoPYRIGHT
LAw SYMPOSIUM 35, 50 (1956).
52 Patent or copyright pools result from the mutual exchange or.acquisition of patent
or copyright rights from others. OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRusr LAWS
443 (1958)- An organization such as ASCAP, where numerous copyright holders
assign their rights to a central licensing agency, would seem to be an example of the
purest form of the pooling device.
"United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. i31 (1948); Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (x944).
' United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
3o6 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (t926).
"Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. x63 (193x).
so United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
" United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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of the entire society in any given matter and, moreover, may do so in
a manner unreasonably detrimental to the interests of other members,
users, competitors, and the public. For this reason, the decree prohibits
participation in any dealings between ASCAP members and licensees
who share a common pecuniary interest. For this reason also, distri-
bution of revenue to the two groups of members is required to be based
primarily upon objective surveys of commercial performances of ASCAP
compositions and upon the members' classification in the Society. To
insure fair and impartial classification, the decree requires a full explana-
tion in writing of the basis of such classification, the maintenance of
complete records regarding classifications, and the recognition of the
right of members to appeal their classifications to an impartial arbiter.
The provisions requiring compulsory licensing of all users at reason-
able fees in the prescribed manner is a device carried over from the
patent field, where it is employed in instances where patent grants have
been used to violate the antitrust laws.5 8 While ASCAP does not have a
history of excluding licensees (indeed, its history shows the opposite
tendency), this provision is necessary to avoid future instances of bitter
disputes with licensees, especially with radio broadcasters and motion-
picture exhibitors.
The decree goes farthest in accommodating ASCAP's position in the
provisions relating to the types of licenses required to be granted. "Per
piece" licensing is required only upon the request of the user and the
approval of the ASCAP member in interest, and it thereby is made
secondary in importance to the issuance of blanket licenses. This is true,
a fortiori, despite the order of the decree requiring ASCAP to avoid
discrimination between the fees for different types of licenses and other-
wise to do its best to offer licensees a genuine choice between the differ-
ent types of licenses. Therefore, it seems clear that these provisions of
the decree are compromises of strict application of the antitrust laws.
Nothing in the copyright law permits combination of copyright owners
for the purpose of setting license fees, nor is such action justified under
the antitrust laws, even though the fees set are reasonable.5 ' Moreover,
the Supreme Court has expressly asserted that practical difficulties con-
fronting patent or copyright owners cannot justify conduct in violation
" United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.s. 319 (1947)); Hartford-Empire v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (945).
"United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., Inc., 350 U.S. 150 (194o )
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of the Sherman Act."' The fact remains, however, that the consent de-
cree of 1950 affirms the propriety of ASCAP's fixing license fees, at
least in the first instance and so long as the fees remain reasonable inamount and in application. At the same time, by upholding ASCAP's
ability to issue blanket licenses, the decree approves what appears, at
least at first blush, to be a tying arrangement of multiple copyrights,
which might well have a tendency to exclude from the market music of
competing nonmembers and give each member a reward based in part
upon the combination with other copyright owners.
As a matter of strict antitrust principle, permitting such an arrange-
ment to continue seems irrational. The Court has indicated in at least
one copyright case, however, that a blanket tying arrangement of copy-
righted products, if optional, is not necessarily unlawful.6 ' On the other
hand, the Court has ruled in patent tie-in cases that an optional quality
will not save such an arrangement. 2 Apparently, the framers of the
consent decree have accepted the former principle but, at the same time,
have endeavored to encourage individual licensing at a competitive fee.
While thus attempting to mitigate the more objectionable aspects
of an ASCAP pooling arrangement, the decree has retained its other,
more beneficial features. Not only is blanket licensing of the ASCAP
repertory the most economically advantageous arrangement from the
standpoint of ASCAP members, but it also permits continuation of an
arrangement most advantageous to large music users-retention of the
immediate right to use any ASCAP composition, a matter of commercial
necessity in the modern entertainment world of round-the-clock per-
formances and all-inclusive tastes. Of course, to the extent that ASCAP
is not a complete monopoly, this practical benefit is not entirely present. 3
CONCLUSION
In the last analysis, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that
ASCAP, without express or implied authorization under the copyright
:o Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (x944).
e' United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
02 International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 45 (1922).
63 The practical benefits to be derived from the existence of a complete performing
right society monopoly, such as those created by statute in many foreign countries, has
led one writer to intimate that the wisest solution to ASCAP's antitrust problems might
be to treat the Society as a public utility. See Finkelstein, Anti-Trust Laws and the
Arts, supra note 2, at 63. See also Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public In-
terest, supra note 2, at 282.
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laws, is, by its very nature, a horizontal price-fixing association of copy-
right owners dealing, as a matter of apparent absolute commercial neces-
sity, in the licensing of performing rights to all the copyrighted products
within its control. But to deny it the ability to act in either of these re-
spects would in reality deny it the ability to exist. Yet, on the other hand,
to permit such activity is to condone an extension of the limited monopoly
granted copyrights by law.
Recognizing this dilemma, the framers of the consent decrees of 1950
determined that the problems facing owners of musical copyrights were
sufficient to justify a relaxed application of the antitrust laws. Although
the decrees include several watchdog provisions and leave open the possi-
bility of dissolution if ASCAP attempts to act beyond the limitations im-
posed, they enable ASCAP to continue to operate effectively in the world
of trade and commerce. That the decrees have been successful seems
evident from the absence of further antitrust action against the Society
since their entry. While ASCAP might most beneficially exist as a public
utility, as has been intimated, 4 it surely was not within the proper
sphere of the court so to decide. By rejecting the extremes, the consent
decrees of 195o appear to have made an admirable and thus far effective
accommodation of both sets of policies involved in the effective operation
of any performing-right society such as ASCAP.
ibid.
